The High Court recently affirmed that the Home Office may serve legal proceedings on foreign transport companies without prior judicial permission, provided that the underlying legislation clearly envisions enforcement against overseas parties.
Facts:
The appellant, Sedico, is a Polish transport company that operated a lorry found by Border Force officers in Calais in June 2023. During a search, four clandestine entrants were discovered hidden inside the vehicle. Consequently, the Home Office issued penalty notices totalling £48,000 against Sedico and its driver, holding the company jointly and severally liable for the fines under the Immigration and Asylum Act (IAA) 1999.
When the penalties remained unpaid past the 60-day deadline, the Secretary of State exercised statutory powers in January 2024 to detain a different vehicle—a tractor and trailer—owned by Sedico that was present within the UK. Sedico appealed the original fines, denying the presence of clandestine entrants and challenging the validity of the notices, but that appeal was eventually dismissed. In March 2024, while the vehicle was still being held, the Home Office initiated a “Part 8 claim” in the County Court at Canterbury, seeking the Court’s permission to sell the detained transporter to recover the outstanding debt.
The central procedural conflict arose because the Home Office served this claim form directly to Sedico in Poland without first asking the English Court for “permission to serve out of the jurisdiction”. Sedico applied to strike out the claim, arguing that such permission was a mandatory requirement under the Civil Procedure Rules (CPRs).
Decision:
The High Court dismissed the appeal. Mr. Justice Soole determined that the case turned on whether the IAA 1999 met the Harrods test. This test dictates that for a claimant to serve papers abroad without court permission under CPR 6.33(3), the underlying statute must “expressly contemplate” proceedings against persons outside the jurisdiction. The statute does not need to use the phrase “service without permission” – it only needs to show, on its face, that the legislature expected the law to be used against foreign parties.
Sedico’s counsel argued that because the Home Office is a government entity, it should be held to a stricter standard of “express wording” than a private citizen. The Court rejected this for two reasons: the first is that CPR 66.2 explicitly states that the CPRs apply to the Crown in the same way they apply to private litigants, unless an enactment specifically states otherwise. Second, the Judge found no legal authority to support the idea that the Harrods test should be more stringent just because the claimant is a public body.
Implications:
This judgement confirms that the Home Office can act with speed and “procedural agility” when a transport company fails to pay civil penalties for clandestine entrants. By ruling that court permission is not required to serve sale proceedings abroad, the Court has made it faster and cheaper for the Home Office to move from detaining a vehicle to selling it. This creates a powerful incentive for foreign companies to pay fines promptly rather than relying on procedural technicalities to delay the loss of their assets.
The case solidifies the principle that the IAA 1999 is inherently international in scope. The ruling makes it clear that being based outside the UK offers no “jurisdictional shield” against the enforcement of border penalties.
Companies must realise that a single incident of clandestine entry can lead to the permanent loss of their fleet. Moreover, the Home Office does not have to seize the specific vehicle involved in the incident, as, in effect, it can seize any vehicle owned by that company which enters the UK.
This case reinforces that the UK’s border extends beyond its physical geography. By categorising the IAA 1999 as a statute that “expressly contemplates” foreign parties, the Court has effectively integrated international transport companies into the UK’s domestic enforcement framework.
